

upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions. (U.N. doc. S/3378)

On March 30, the Security Council met again and unanimously adopted the second resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 696) In it, the Council requested the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to introducing practical measures to preserve security in the area, noted the concrete proposals already made by the Chief of Staff, and called upon the two governments to cooperate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals. (U.N. doc. S/3379)

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 1, 1955—7 p.m.

1261. Shortly after my arrival I received word that Gamal Abdel Nasser would like to meet with me secretly at an early date and without regard to waiting my presentation of credentials. I met with him last night for a lengthy discussion in a private home. He was accompanied by Zakaria Mohieddin, Ali Sabri, and Major Touhami.

Entire evening devoted to discussion of Turk-Iraq pact and Egyptian line fully reported in messages prior to my arrival. I sensed an intense dislike for Nuri Said as a person that I had not previously taken into account in my attempt to assess present emotional situation. Nasser himself was more restrained than his colleagues and I got impression he was either tired of talking about problem or realized that RCC were out on a limb from which it would be hard to crawl back. He seemed at times to be aware that Egypt had suffered a defeat and made frequent references to "what is done is done and there is no point in assessing blame. Instead we should all think in terms of the future".

I am unable at this early stage to understand fully the apparent depth of Egyptian feeling. There is no doubt in my mind that Nasser sincerely feels he was cast aside by US in favor of Nuri of Iraq. I believe he feels that he had presented a definite alternative to the West, although in our logic any plan he has spoken of in the past has been entirely nebulous. I believe he had conceived that his task

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Byroada, Henry A. Secret. Received at 7:51 p.m. Repeated to London.